Corporate-Market Power and Ideological Domination: The Propaganda Model after 30 Years – Relevance and Further Application

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14.1 Introduction

The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model (henceforth PM) is confirmed by a large body of scholarship.[1] Already thirty years ago, when *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* was initially published authors of a range of scholarly studies produced findings in agreement with the main predictions of the PM.[2] In spite of that, the PM has been marginalized by Western scholarship.[3] The emergence of the internet and the new digital media environment (henceforth NME) have contributed towards further weakening the cogency of PM and related approaches. The decentralized structure of the NME as well as novel applications such as Web 2.0 allow for multi-dimensional flows of information thus potentially rendering gatekeeping models obsolete. As a consequence, a new wave of claims about novel and nearly unprecedented

media freedoms has emerged in academia.[4] The arguments of the so-called internet celebrants, who mirror the postulations of the liberal school of thought in media and Communication Studies, have been somewhat mitigated by scholars who have been pointing to the flaws of what constitutes outright technicism.[5]

Notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship far too often lacks a structural critique of the corporate media system and its continued role as a dominant institution that serves state-corporate elite interests. In fact, much contemporary scholarship is concerned with applied research based on quantitative research designs at the expense of investigating broader societal issues.[6] This is striking because next to a digital revolution we are currently witnessing an era of almost unprecedented inequality, consolidation of power, militarization, serial Western wars, secret interventions, and retail-terrorist blowbacks as well as nuclear, and climate disasters.[7] McChesney, in fact, argues that society needs 'engaged communication scholarship from a broad range of traditions and employing a diverse set of methodologies to address the issues before us.'[8] A PM approach, which is underpinned by an epistemology aimed at challenging the co-optation of the media by powerful forces in society, should certainly factor well in what we conclude to be significant scholarly debates. Robertson even suggests the PM would still 'be of enormous value as a tool for direct criticism of complicit mainstream media by both elite academics and a much wider population of citizens.'[9]

The aim of this two-part-essay is to further consolidate the relevance and applicability of the PM in the internet age as well as to point to areas that promise its fruitful application. More specifically, part one of the essay will highlight the continued significance of corporate-market constraints as major news 'filters.' Part two will address the issue of ideology, arguing that 'humanitarianism' has become a major reference point to justify Western militarism. The concluding section will outline a set of broad research areas for scholars interested in applying PM.

14.2 Corporate-Market Constraints: Still the Engine of Media Deception

The technological architecture of the NME enables one-to-many and many-to-many flows of communication on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The World Wide Web, as a major service of the internet, allows for a multitude of applications that can be utilized in different ways to distribute information. Digitalization has eliminated spectrum scarcity entry barriers so that any individual or organization can set up web-applications to distribute information or otherwise communicate with people on local, national and international levels. With current technology, textual, audial, or visual information can easily be uploaded on a website and instantly be distributed across the globe. Further-

more, mobile phones and cameras accelerate the rapid exchange of information about world events. Hence, during the 1990s and subsequently, a dominant school of thought about the internet emerged that highlighted these virtues of digital technology.[10] Scholars, politicians, journalists, and public experts claimed that the internet would lead towards democratization, media freedom and empowerment potentially enabling a true Habermasian public sphere.[11] But as McChesney has highlighted, much of the scholarship and commentary about the internet had 'a single, deep, and often fatal flaw that severely compromises the value of their work' which constituted their 'ignorance about really existing capitalism and an underappreciation of how capitalism dominates social life.'[12] The so-called internet celebrants have overemphasized the technological potential of the internet, thereby neglecting to interrogate how digital technology had been shaped by economic power.[13]

   McChesney's critique echoed important postulations that had been evoked in earlier epochs when shifts in media technology occurred. In 1973, Murdock and Golding cautioned 'against the euphoria which often accompanies discussion of […] new media technologies.'[14] While speaking to developments in broadcasting, most notably innovations such as cable, cassette and satellite technology, Murdock and Golding pointed to an important fact:

> In each of the media there is an increasingly apparent opposition between the social potentialities for redifferentiation and the trends towards economic concentration. New techniques permitting greater control by the consumer, greater fragmentation and localization, and cheaper production are quickly being enveloped in the same economic structure […].[15]

Murdock and Golding advanced the political economy perspective of the media suggesting that how media technology may evolve is crucially linked to wider societal structures and processes. Applying this framework, scholars have pointed to the fact that the technological potential of the internet had not been realized at the beginning of the twentieth century.[16] In agreement with the postulation by Murdock and Golding, scholars have highlighted how the evolving internet technology has been shaped by economic structure. Most notably, and despite major technological changes, the institutional environment that constituted the old mass media system has remained intact.[17] Due to the 'privatization' of important web-infrastructure during the 1990s, corporations became the major driving forces of the internet.[18] Furthermore, most internet transactions and applications became regulated via markets that have developed in a highly oligopolistic fashion - a well-known phenomenon in the media industries. Online market concentration was facilitated by network effects because, unlike in traditional media markets, the value of an online application increases relative to the amount of its users.[19] Furthermore, companies created artificial market entry barriers through conglomeration, the setting and patenting of

technological standards as well as copyright legislation.[20] Corporate-market control has locked the internet by way of monopoly. Wu summarised the state of the developments as follows: 'There is strong reason to believe that there is nothing new under the sun, that the great universal network is as disposed to monopoly as its predecessors.'[21]

The underbelly of corporate online concentration constitutes advertising, which has effectively honeycombed the internet. Major online markets for social media, search engines, internet access and e-commerce are underwritten by targeted advertising based on surveillance. Since the 'privatization' of the internet, the advertising industry has shaped media policy enabling the use of cookies and other user tracking technology.[22] Today, major online firms including Facebook and Google, the leading companies in terms of users and revenues, use business models that rest on the exploitation of online user data for advertising purposes. Fuchs explained how this system operates with reference to Facebook:

> Surveillance on Facebook is surveillance of prosumers, who dynamically and permanently create and share user-generated content, browse profiles and data, interact with others, join, create, and build communities, and co-create information. The corporate web platform operators and their third-party advertising clients continuously monitor and record personal data and online activities; they store, merge and analyse collected data. This allows them to create detailed user profiles and to know about the personal interests and online behaviour of the users. Facebook sells its prosumers as a commodity to advertising clients. Money is exchanged for the access to user data that allows economic surveillance of the users.[23]

In the same fashion, Google, which has a portfolio of services including online search, e-mail, maps, video (YouTube) and operating systems (Android), amongst others, constitutes 'a vast network for the collection and mining of personal data.'[24] It is estimated that 90 per cent of Google's revenues stem from selling online adverts. Moreover, Google accounts for one third of the spending of global advertising.[25] As Fuchs further commented:

> Google generates and stores data about the usage of these services in order to enable targeted advertising. It sells these data to the advertising clients, who then provide advertisements that are targeted to the activities, searches, contents and interests of the users of Google services.[26]

Next to Google and Facebook, a multitude of other companies engage in similar activities. Turow described these practices as 'one of history's most massive efforts in stealth marketing.'[27] Online advertising, of course, poses serious questions about the nature and implications of surveillance. Furthermore, these

developments demonstrate that the internet is geared towards the interests of the corporate and advertising industries. As McChesney observed: 'In most internet areas where profits can be generated, private interests have been able to convert beachheads into monopoly fortresses and generate endless profits. […] Today, the internet as a social medium and information system is the domain of a handful of colossal firms.'[28]

The issues outlined above directly translate into the applicability of the first and second institutional 'filters' theorized by PM: the media's concentration in ownership size and audience markets as well as advertising dependency.[29] The performance of novel online applications is, thus, likely biased towards the interests that underwrite them. Hence, in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin cautioned against advertising sponsorship: 'We expect that advertising funded search engines will be inherently biased towards the advertisers and away from the needs of consumers.'[30] Years later, when Google had already started to use advertising, some of its competitors had alleged that Google's searches might weight their results for the benefit of its commercial offerings thus undermining choice.[31] Similarly, at a US Senate hearing in 2011, Senator Herb Kohl asked: 'Is it possible for Google to be both an unbiased search engine and at the same time own a vast portfolio of Web-based products and services?'[32] Much more research is needed to answer questions about how corporate-market power and advertising funding might specifically impact online searches, networking, and other novel web-applications. For scholars utilizing the PM, this significant research gap, in fact, opens up new areas beyond the usually applied studies of news media content. Moreover, this section has so far revealed that the online environment is constrained by corporate power in the same fashion as theorized by PM.

This is similarly true for the realm of news, which has been the primary concern of studies using PM. The internet has not facilitated major changes in terms of corporate news media performance. It is well documented that contemporary off- and online news media sectors are heavily consolidated and commercialized.[33] Digital technology allows for the establishment of novel online offerings. This technically enables the production and distribution of news and could foster diversity in sources and opinions. Yet, at this point in time, a myriad of novel information websites and blogs are confined to niche spaces on the web - virtually invisible to larger publics.[34] In contrast, the traditional news media brands are still the dominant forces in the online world.[35] Markets for online news are heavily concentrated in terms of audiences. A major study by Hindman found that 'online audience concentration equals or exceeds that found in most traditional media.'[36]

It is true that consumption is becoming more fragmented as people increasingly use social media, mobile applications as well as aggregators based on algorithmic content selection to access news. Yet, these trends have not changed the fact that a handful of news brands remain dominant.[37] People may access news via social media and other applications. However, the news content that users

actually consume stems from a small set of news brands. Accordingly, the 2016 *Digital News Report* of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found 'that even in the era of social media and atomised media, news organisations and traditional news brands still matter enormously' and 'most of the content consumed still comes from newspaper groups, broadcasters, or digital born brands that have invested in original content.'[38] While there are some novel, so-called online-only news organisations such as the *Huffington Post* or *Buzz-Feed*, research suggests that the top news brands in terms of audiences are large corporations. For instance, a report by the Media Reform Coalition found that in the UK, five companies accounted for 80 per cent of newspaper consumption including online, mobile readers and offline. In terms of local news, the report found that six giant conglomerates shared 80 per cent of all outlets while more than 50 other publishers allotted the remaining 20 per cent of titles. Similarly, the broadcasting sector in the UK was heavily consolidated with big US companies like Rupert Murdoch's 21st Century Fox empire, Liberty Global and Viacom International encroaching the market.[39] The authors of the report for the Media Reform Coalition drew the following conclusion:

> We believe that concentration within news and information markets in particular has reached endemic levels in the UK and that we urgently need effective remedies. This kind of concentration creates conditions in which wealthy individuals and organisations can amass huge political and economic power and distort the media landscape to suit their interests and personal views. Urgent reform is needed in order both to address high levels of concentration in particular media markets and to protect against further concentration in others.[40]

The current state of the media system thus suggests applicability of the analytical categories of the PM, which place importance on how corporate control and consolidation as well as market pressures determine news choices. As Herman explained, the PM's

> crucial structural factors derive from the fact that the dominant media are firmly embedded in the market system. They are profit-seeking businesses, owned by very wealthy people (or other companies); and they are funded largely by advertisers who are also profit-seeking entities, and who want their advertisements to appear in a supportive selling environment.[41]

Hence, as Herman further pointed out, these structural factors should be seen as 'the only possible root of the systematic patterns of media behaviour and performance.'[42]

Given the preceding outline of validity of the PM's structural foundations, the following section explores the continued relevance of ideology and discusses

issues that are important in terms of resultant news media content bias. The chapter concludes by briefly outlining potential topics for further study.

14.3 Ideological Domination: Humanitarianism, Atrocities Management and Elite Utility of Suffering

Much scholarship applying the PM has focused on how military adventures, wars, and foreign policy issues have been reported in the news. Ideology has been an important concept in this research area: firstly, ideology has been used to explain why certain events and issues are able to permeate news filtering processes as opposed to others – as outlined by the fifth 'filter' of PM. Secondly, PM researchers have argued that media content patterns tend to be aligned with specific elite interests. As a result, corporate media content is regarded as necessarily ideological. Of course, both issues are connected: ideological assumptions can pass through the news gates if they are congruent with dominant ideology (the fifth 'filter') and consequently manifest as ideological media content. The section below thus further explores the continued relevance of as well as crucial shifts in contemporary ideology.

Traditionally, scholars have been concerned with how 'anti-communism' has served as an important ideological tool to legitimize policies in favour of state-corporate elites.[43] For example, 'anti-communism,' also coined as the ideology of the 'Cold War' or the 'Soviet threat,' was used as a reference point to justify US military interventions after World War II.[44] Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, 'anti-Soviet' ideology has become less important as a schema to legitimise foreign policy adventures.[45] According to Shalom: 'With the collapse of the Soviet threat, US officials have had to work overtime to concoct new alibis to disguise US foreign policy.'[46]

Research has established that governments have employed a range of devices to explain, justify, and rationalise overt and/or covert military interventions in the affairs of sovereign states.[47] Hence, old and new ideological narratives used to justify interventionist foreign policy agendas have been elaborated in the circles of state-corporate power. They include ideologies such as 'free-market democracy,' the 'war on terror,' the 'war on drugs,' 'basic Western benevolence,' and 'humanitarianism.'[48]

In terms of military intervention, 'humanitarianism,' applied as a highly selective interventionist ideology to shame countries unwilling to integrate into the 'Washington Consensus,' has obtained particular prominence since 1991.[49] 'Humanitarianism' played a major role in policy and news media discussions about potential or actual intervention in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Darfur (2003–2017), Libya (2011), and Syria (2012–2018).[50] 'Humanitarianism' was also evoked, in conjunction with other ideological devices, to legitimise the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War.[51] It should be noted that 'humanitarianism' as an ideology can

transport valid reasoning about human rights violations and how they should be addressed to alleviate human suffering. On the other hand, PM scholars have been concerned with how 'humanitarianism' has been instrumentalized to serve a narrow militarist agenda whose ultimate goal is not to stop human rights violations but to impose Western designs on other nations. Some examples of this will be further explored below.

An under-researched sub-set of 'humanitarianism' constitutes what this author defines as atrocity-shaming. In his early work on propaganda during World War I, Lasswell found that one goal of propaganda was 'to mobilise hatred against the enemy.'[52] According to Lasswell, this involved representing an oppositional country 'as a menacing, murderous aggressor.'[53] Such propaganda depicted the enemy in contrast to the noble aims of the home state and was used to legitimize the war effort to the public in the home country.[54]

Atrocity-shaming had also been the topic of early work by Chomsky and Herman who looked at how human rights violations conducted by so-called 'enemy' states of the West were designated to the status of nefarious bloodbaths.[55] Nefarious bloodbaths were highlighted in Western policy and human rights circles and consequently received significant news media attention. During the process of atrocity-shaming, designated perpetrator countries faced serious repercussions like criminal proceedings, sanctions, and regime-change interventions.[56] According to Chomsky and Herman, nefarious bloodbaths served 'an extremely important public relations function in mobilizing support for US military intervention.'[57] Chomsky and Herman's research demonstrates how countries have been shamed selectively if this served Western strategic interests. So-called 'allied' states of the West have largely remained exempt from public campaigns of shaming even if they conducted similar or greater human rights violations than 'enemy' states.[58]

Moreover, shaming has led to intervention even in cases when evidence for atrocities was hardly conclusive and the identity of perpetrators far from clear. For instance, NATO used the so-called 1999 Račak massacre in Kosovo as a pretext for intervention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, although facts suggested that the dead could have been killed in battle.[59] In fact, during the Yugoslav Wars, fought roughly between 1991–1999, selective atrocity-shaming took place in a range of theatres. Studies suggest that the Western news media, policy and human rights systems have mainly focused on Serbian villainy when assessing these conflicts.[60] Thus, atrocities conducted by the Serbs against Bosnians, like the Srebrenica massacre, have received significant media attention and were framed as genocide.[61] On the other hand, the major news media have failed to interrogate the preceding violence in the Srebrenica vicinity, conducted by Bosnian paramilitary forces against the Serbs.[62] Similarly, what arguably constituted one of the largest ethnic cleansings during the Yugoslav Wars, the purge of the Serbs of the Krajina (in the Republic of Croatia), has largely been ignored in the West.[63] In these latter cases of violence against the Serbs, the genocide label has not been applied in the West. This dichotomised framing of victims of violence has served Western policy objectives of establishing frag-

mented and estranged client states in the Balkans. In contrast, a more objective treatment of atrocities committed by all sides in the conflict could arguably have better contributed towards conflict resolution and reconciliation.[64]

Atrocity-shaming as an ideology to demonise an opponent has achieved its peak performance during the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The alleged 2011 Benghazi crackdown on protestors in Libya was used as a justification for NATO intervention against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi on the basis of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. It turned out, however, that the Benghazi 'massacre' was manufactured.[65] Careful analysis of the documentary record demonstrates that Gaddafi's forces had not used force indiscriminately against protestors.[66]

Similarly, in the present war in Syria, atrocities have been instrumentalised to justify proxy- and big power intervention.[67] In the Syrian theatre, a range of atrocities has been linked to the Syrian government and its forces. In many of these cases, however, responsibility for crimes could hardly be established because independent verification has not been possible. Furthermore, evidence suggested that the Syrian 'opposition' aimed at inciting foreign intervention by way of manufacturing bloodbaths.[68] Yet, contested atrocities like the Houla, Ghouta, or Khan Sheikhoun incidents have been used to justify regime-change agendas in Syria.[69]

The violence of preceding wars such as in Yugoslavia was evoked as an example to call for preventive 'humanitarian' interventions. But how likely is it that Western military force is going to mitigate violence? In both Libya and Syria, Western intervention has had significant repercussions: Kuperman estimated that, 'NATO intervention magnified the death toll in Libya by about seven to ten times.'[70] Moreover, Libyan society fragmented along sectarian lines. At the same time, public health and security collapsed, sending bursts of refugees towards Europe.[71] In Syria, proxy-intervention sparked high-intensity conflict and prolonged a deadly stalemate between the Syrian Army and 'opposition' forces.[72] Additionally, violent conflict fostered the disintegration of the Syrian nation state. Taken together, intervention in Libya and Syria destabilised the Middle East and fostered the rise of ISIS as well as the massive refugee crisis of 2014/2015.[73] As a PM would predict, these violent repercussions have largely been ignored by the news media in terms of relegating Western responsibility. Yet, the Balkanisation of the Middle East was well in line with US- and EU policy interests of establishing a set of weak and obedient vassal states. 'Humanitarian' ideology was crucial in facilitating these outcomes.[74]

14.4 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the continued relevance of PM in terms of three of its news 'filters': corporate-market power, advertising dependency, and ideology. Moreover, the chapter further provides indicative evidence that major conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been reported in the same dichotomous fashion that a PM would predict. Significantly, 'humanitarianism' has been

applied as an ideological device during highly selective campaigns of shaming that led to military intervention. This suggests a shift from Cold War to 'humanitarian' ideology. Of course, the presented examples only constitute a first approximation and much more research is needed to solidify the extent to which the PM remains relevant in the internet era. The following list provides some of the research areas that may be utilized for further study:

1. Assessing the impact of corporate-market constraints and advertising funding on the performance of online applications such as online search, networking, news, blogging, etc…
2. Providing a comprehensive empirical overview of PM's 'filters' in relation to traditional as well as online news sectors.
3. Investigating potential changes and refinements to PM's 'filters' under consideration of increased political and interest-group pressure levelled against the free flow of information (e.g. suppression of whistle blowers, campaign against Wikileaks, etc.).
4. Investigating the vast PR and propaganda industries that currently use the internet to disseminate targeted 'information.'
5. Studying off- and online reporting of high- and low-intensity conflicts such as in Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Ukraine or Bahrain, the refugee crisis, as well as domestic political, economic and social issues in consideration of PM's predictions.

Notes and Bibliography

[1] For an overview of some of this literature see Florian Zollmann (2009), 'Is It Either or? Professional Ideology Vs. Corporate-Media Constraints,' *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture*, 6: 97–118. See also Joan Pedro (2011), 'The Propaganda Model in the Early 21st Century Part I and Part II,' *International Journal of Communication*, 5: 1865–1926.
[2] For an overview of some of the early studies that support the PM see Noam Chomsky (1989), *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies* (London: Pluto Press), Appendix 1 as well as chapter 1 note 23.
[3] Ibid, 153ff; see also Eric Herring and Piers Robinson (2003), 'Too Polemical or too Critical? Chomsky on the Study of the News Media and US Foreign Policy,' *Review of International Studies* 29: 553–568 and Andrew Mullen (2010), 'Twenty Years On: the Second-Order Prediction of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model,' *Media, Culture & Society* 32(4): 673–690.
[4] For an overview of this debate see Robert W. McChesney (2013), *Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism Is Turning the Internet Against Democracy* New York:, the New Press, 5–8.
[5] See Robert G. Picard (2015), 'The Humanisation of Media? Social Media and the Reformation of Communication,' *Communication Research and*

Practice 1: 35. See particularly McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*. McChesney also refers to the so-called internet celebrants mentioned above. For further context see also footnote 13.

[6] See Robert W. McChesney (2007), *Communication Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of Media*, New York, The New Press, pp.6–7.

[7] See Florian Zollmann (2015), 'Nineteen Eighty-Four in 2014: Power, Politics and Surveillance in Western Democracies,' in *George Orwell Now!*, ed. Richard Lance Keeble, New York, Peter Lang, pp.31–47.

[8] McChesney, *Communication Revolution*, 7–8.

[9] John W. Robertson (2010), 'The Propaganda Model in 2011: Stronger Yet Still Neglected in UK Higher Education?' *Synaesthesia Communication Across Cultures* 1(2010): 32.

[10] McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*, 12.

[11] See McChesney, Ibid, 5.

[12] McChesney, Ibid, 13.

[13] McChesney uses the term celebrants for this school of thought. McChesney draws from Robin Mansell who initially assessed the internet literature in terms of celebrants and sceptics. See *Digital Disconnect*, 4ff.

[14] Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1973), 'For a Political Economy of Mass Communications,' *The Socialist Register* 10: 230–231.

[15] Murdock and Golding, 'For a Political Economy,' 230.

[16] See McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*, 4–5. See also Robert G. Picard (2012), 'The Humanisation of Media' and James Curran (2012), 'Reinterpreting the Internet,' in *Misunderstanding the Internet*, James Curran, Natalie Fenton, and Des Freedman (eds.), London, Routledge, pp.3–33.

[17] The material and arguments provided in this section rest on McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*.

[18] Ibid, 104.

[19] Ibid, 132.

[20] Ibid, 132–134.

[21] Tim Wu (2010), *The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires*, London, Atlantic Books, p.18.

[22] See McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*, 146–148.

[23] Christian Fuchs (2014), *Social Media: A Critical Introduction*, London, Sage, p.169.

[24] Michael Wignall (2014), 'Google: What It Is, Why You Should Avoid It and How,' *Ethical Consumer* September/October, 26.

[25] Ibid, 26.

[26] Fuchs, *Social Media*, 131.

[27] Cited in McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*, 149.

[28] Ibid, 131, 137.

[29] See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (2008), *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media,* 3rd edn. (London: The Bodley Head).

[30] Cited in McChesney, *Digital Disconnect*, 102.

31   Wignall, 'Google,' 26.

32   Ibid, 26.

33   See Florian Zollmann (2015), 'The Relevance of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model in the 21st Century New Media Environment,' in *News from Somewhere: A Reader in Communication & Challenges to Globalization*, Daniel Broudy, Jeffery Klaehn and James Winter (eds.), Eugene, OR, Wayzgoose Press, pp.143–161.

34   See Matthew Hindman (2009), *The Myth of Digital Democracy,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

35   See James Curran (2012), 'Reinterpreting the Internet,' in *Misunderstanding the Internet*, James Curran, Natalie Fenton and Des Freedman eds., London: Routledge, pp.3–33. See also the discussion in Zollmann, 'Relevance of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model.'

36   Hindman, *Myth of Digital Democracy*, 17.

37   For a study suggesting the increasing use of social media and mobile applications to access the news see Nic Newman with Richard Fletcher, David A. L. Levy and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen (2016), *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2016* (Oxford: University of Oxford).

38   Ibid, 26.

39   For the report and the data outlined above see Media Reform Coalition, *Who Owns the UK Media*, 3, 11. Available online at: http://www.mediareform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Who_owns_the_UK_media-report_plus_appendix1.pdf (accessed 29 June 2017).

40   Ibid, 3.

41   Edward S. Herman (2000), 'The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective,' *Journalism Studies* 1(1): 102.

42   Ibid, 101.

43   Zollmann, 'Is It Either or?,' 99.

44   See Daniel C. Hallin (1989), *The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press), Stephen Rosskamm Shalom (1993), *Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing Intervention After the Cold War* (Boston, MA: South End Press) and William Blum (2004), *Killing Hope: US Military & CIA Interventions since World War II,* 2nd edn. (London: Zed Books).

45   Robert M. Entman (2004), *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).

46   Shalom, *Imperial Alibis*, 3.

47   Ibid.

48   See Herman, 'The Propaganda Model'; Piers Robinson (2004), 'Researching US Media–State Relations and Twenty-First Century Wars,' in *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*, Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer eds. (2004), London and New York, Routledge, pp.96–112; Matt Kennard (2015), *The Racket: A Rogue Reporter vs. The Masters of the Universe* (London: Zed Books); Mark Curtis (2003), *Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World* (London: Vintage)

and Philip Hammond (2007), *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: the Media and International Intervention* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

49 See Noam Chomsky (2012), *A New Generation Draws the Line: Humanitarian Intervention and the 'Responsibility to Protect' Today* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers).

50 See Ibid; Hammond, *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts*; Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman eds., (2000) *Degraded Capability: the Media and the Kosovo Crisis* (London: Pluto Press); Edward S. Herman and David Peterson (2007), 'The Dismantling of Yugoslavia,' *Monthly Review*, 59. Available at http://monthlyreview.org/2007/10/01/the-dismantling-of-yugoslavia (Accessed 12 July 2017); Edward S. Herman and David Peterson (2010), *The Politics of Genocide* (New York: Monthly Review Press); Piers Robinson (2000), 'Research Note: the News Media and Intervention: Triggering the Use of Air Power During Humanitarian Crises,' *European Journal of Communication*, 15: 405–414 and Piers Robinson et al. (2010), *Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

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52 Harold D. Lasswell (1971 [1927]), *Propaganda Technique in World War I* Cambridge, MA., M.I.T. Press, p.195.

53 Ibid

54 Ibid.

55 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman (1979), *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: the Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I*, Nottingham: Spokesman, p.97.

56 See Florian Zollmann (2017), *Media, Propaganda and the Politics of Intervention* (New York: Peter Lang).

57 See Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection*, 97.

58 See Herman and Peterson, *Politics of Genocide* and Zollmann, *Politics of Intervention*.

59 See Herman and Peterson, *Politics of Genocide*, Michael Mande (2005)l, *Pax Pentagon: wie die USA der Welt den Krieg als Frieden Verkauft* (Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins) and Zollmann, *Politics of Intervention*.

60 For an overview see Herman and Peterson, 'Dismantling of Yugoslavia.' See also Peter Brock (2005), *Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting: Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia*, 2nd edn.(Los Angeles, CA: Graphics Management Press).

61 See Herman and Peterson, *Politics of Genocide*, 47–48.

62 For the Srebrenica context see Lewis Mackenzie (2005), 'The Real Story Behind Srebrenica,' *The Globe and Mail*, 14 July: Available at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-real-story-behind-srebrenica/article737584/ (accessed on 12 July 2017).

63 See Herman and Peterson, *Politics of Genocide*, 81ff.

64   See Denis Dzidic (2015), 'Distored Remebrance Culture 'Traps Bosnia in Past," *Balkan Transitional Justice*, 12 October: Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/distorted-remembrance-culture-traps-bosnia-in-past--10-09-2015 (Accessed 17 July 2017).

65   Zollmann, *Politics of Intervention*.

66   See Alan J. Kuperman (2013), 'A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign,' *International Security,* 38: 105–136.

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68   See Tim Anderson (2016), *The Dirty War on Syria: Washington, Regime Change and Resistance* (Montréal: Global Research Publishers).

69   For a discussion of some of these cases see Anderson, *Dirty War on Syria*. See also Florian Zollmann (2017), 'Giftgas in Syrien,' *Publik-Forum Extra Leben*, Juni: 30–31.

70   Kuperman, 'A Model Humanitarian Intervention?', 123.

71   See Florian Zollmann (2015), 'Tormenting Libya,' *teleSUR,* 6 August: Available at: http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Tormenting-Libya-20150806-0031.html (Accessed 9 February 2017).

72   See Diana Johnstone (2016), 'Destroying Syria: A Joint Criminal Enterprise,' *Counterpunch,* 4 October: Available at: http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/04/overthrowing-the-syrian-government-a-joint-criminal-enterprise/ (Accessed 9 February 2017).

73   See Florian Zollmann (2015), 'Refugees and the Crime Against Peace,' *teleSUR*, 25 September. Available at: http://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Refugees-and-the-Crime-Against-Peace-20150913-0024.html (Accessed 9 February 2017).

74   See Zollmann, *Politics of Intervention*.